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Abstract: This paper analyzes scal competition among numerous spatially-
separated jurisdictions in an explicitly dynamic framework. The degree of fac-
tor mobility between jurisdictions is imperfect because it is costly and time-
consuming to adjust factor stocks. Even if it is harmful in the long run, tax-
ation of mobile factors redistribute income in favor of the owners of immobile
resources in the short run. The optimal tax on mobile factors is lower, the faster
the speed with which factors adjust to scal policy. Anticipated taxes are less
benecial than those that can be imposed unexpectedly.
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The ability of governments to redistribute income is often constrained by private-
sector behavioral adjustments. Classic examples of such behavior are labor/leisure
substitution by taxpayers and by the beneciaries of redistributive transfers.
Another constraint, which has been emphasized in the now-large literature on
scal competition, stems from the fact that governments cannot or may choose
not to control the movement of economic resources, especially labor and capi-
tal, across jurisdictional boundaries (see, e.g., Cremer et al. (1996), Wildasin
(1998), Wellisch (2000), and references therein.) When the government at-
tempts to capture resources from some in order to nance benets for others,
the \contributors" may be able to move themselves, or the resources that they
own, beyond the reach of the taxing authority. When a government attempts
to pursue a policy that benets one group, other potential beneciaries may
move into the locality, state/province, or country in order to gain access to
those benets. Governments may of course attempt to limit these sorts of be-
havioral adjustments, for example through restrictions on population or capital
movements. And, quite aside from government restrictions, these adjustments
are not costless. Indeed, limited mobility of resources is of critical importance
for the analysis of redistribution; if all resources were costlessly mobile, then, as
recognized long ago by Stigler (1957), redistribution would be essentially infea-
sible. This realization has led many authors to argue, as a normative matter,
that redistribution should be undertaken by central governments; lower-level
governments, it is argued, are \too open" to engage eectively redistribution.
Whether normatively desirable or not, it is certainly true empirically that
national governments (in OECD countries, for example) are responsible for the
vast bulk of government redistribution, both on the tax and on the expenditure
sides of the government budget. From the viewpoint of political economy, this
is perhaps not surprising: because mobility of resources constrains the abilities
of lower-level governments to confer benets to some at the expense of others,
the return to political action at the local level may be relatively modest, and
the equilibrium level of local redistribution may be correspondingly small in
comparison with higher-level governments. If redistributive politics is about
rent transfers, the geographic mobility of resources is important for political
economy because the \degree" of mobility aects the amount rents to be gained
or lost through policy change.
Although the theoretical literature on scal competition has drawn consid-
erable attention to the importance of resource mobility, it has generally done so
by drawing sharp and not always consistent distinctions between those resources
that are assumed to be costlessly mobile and those that are perfectly immobile.
For example, capital is sometimes viewed as freely mobile while labor is regarded
as immobile; in other cases, labor is treated as mobile while capital is immobile.
Finer-grained distinctions are not uncommon in the literature. Depending on
the context and desired applications, mobility may be postulated for the young,
the old, the poor, the unskilled, the rich, the skilled, or for portfolio capital,
for capital used in direct investment, for capital in certain sectors or industries,
1and so forth. Natural resources such as land, minerals, or natural harbors are
of course intrinsically immobile (although ownership rights in these resources
may be tradeable), but the public infrastructure that makes them accessible is
sometimes viewed as xed, sometimes as variable. The literature also varies
in the assumptions made about the geographic scope of factor markets. Some-
times, capital is assumed to be mobile among a group of localities within a given
metropolitan area but xed in supply to the area as a whole; sometimes, capital
mobility is postulated among regions within a country but not among countries;
sometimes, it is postulated among countries within the EU but not worldwide;
and sometimes, capital is assumed to be mobile throughout the entire world.
The widely-diering modeling approaches found in the theoretical literature
highlight the need for more systematic identication of the degree of mobility
of dierent resources. The goal of the present analysis is to present an analyt-
ical framework within which the degree of mobility of resources is determined
endogenously as a result of rational economic behavior by resource owners, and
to show how this behavior can be taken into account in the study of scal com-
petition. This is done by recognizing that the resources that are the targets of
scal policy, including especially redistributive scal policy, are stocks, like the
stock of capital or the stock of labor, that adjust gradually over time as a result
of ows, like the ow of investment or the ow of migration. The rates of these
ows are determined, in response to economic incentives, by the owners of these
resources. Stock adjustment behavior is intrinsically dynamic in nature: the
movement of resources among jurisdictions, that is, across space, is a process
that occurs gradually, that is, over time. The analysis builds on standard mod-
els of costly dynamic adjustment that have been heavily exploited in empirical
models of investment (see Turnovsky (2000).1
The next section of the paper presents the basic model, solves for the
comparative-dynamic response of a small and open economy to permanent and
unanticipated perturbations of scal policy, and shows how a competitive juris-
diction chooses its optimal policy, given the nature of the dynamic adjustment
process. Section 3 explores what happens when local policies do not take eco-
nomic agents by surprise but are, at least to some degree, anticipated by them.
This analysis amounts, technically speaking, to a generalization of the case of
unanticipated policy changes, and the results dier from those of the preceding
1Several previous studies have examined some aspects of intertemporal scal competition,
though none have explicitly addressed dynamic adjustment. Jensen and Toma (1991) develop
a two-period model of tax competition in which a pair of governments use debt policy to
manipulate the intertemporal structure of taxation. Dynamic models of scal competition
with imperfectly mobile households are discussed by Hercowitz and Pines (1991) and Wildasin
and Wilson (1996). Lee (1997) analyzes a two-period model in which capital in the second
period is imperfectly mobile. Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) examine a two-period model and
show that taxation of perfectly-mobile resources may enable a jurisdiction to capture rents
from non-resident owners of local immobile resources. Kehoe (1989) discusses the problem
of time-consistent taxation of mobile capital. It is not uncommon for game-theoretic models
of strategic scal competition to be formulated as \stage games" with sequential decision
structures e.g., Walz and Wellisch (1996), though these typically focus on the determination
of a single equilibrium constellation of private and public choices rather than on the evolution
of these choices over time.
2case in ways that can be easily interpreted in relation to them. For the pur-
poses of Sections 2 and 3, the owners of immobile resources within the small
economy are treated as a single representative agent and the imperfectly mo-
bile resources that adjust dynamically are interpreted as capital controlled by
rms that are owned in part by non-residents. Fiscal policy, under this inter-
pretation, allows for redistribution between residents and non-resident owners
of rms. Section 4, however, discusses extensions of the analysis, emphasizing
that the key ndings are applicable to any redistribution between immobile and
partially-mobile resources. Section 4 also discusses the application of the anal-
ysis to competition within a system of jurisdictions, and among jurisdictions of
dierent geographical scales. Section 5 concludes briey.
2 Tax Competition with Adjustment Costs
2.1 The Model
The focus of attention is a single small jurisdiction, assumed for most of the
analysis to be inhabited by identical, innitely-lived immobile households who
can be treated as a representative agent. The model assumes no uncertainty,
perfect capital markets, and continuous time.
Households. Preferences are described by a lifetime utility function R 1
0 u(xt;Gt;t)dt where u(xt;Gt;t) is the discounted instantaneous utility de-
rived from consumption of a single composite numeraire commodity xt and a
local public expenditures Gt. In order to focus on the structure of local tax
policy, the time path of local public good provision is treated as exogenously
xed throughout. Preferences are monotonic in xt.
The household supplies one unit of a non-traded input called \labor" at each
moment; this can be viewed as an aggregate of all local xed inputs. The return
to labor is determined in a perfectly competitive local market, and its return
at time t is denoted wt. Capital earns an exogenously-xed and time-invariant
rate of return r on the world market, and the households can borrow or lend as
desired at this interest rate. Let t denote the prots accruing to local rms at
time t, and assume that the local household owns a share  of these rms, with
0    1. The present value of this ownership share is thus 
R 1
0 te rtdt. The
household may also own a share of the prots of rms outside of the locality,
the present value of which is    0, an endowment of capital  k  0, and an
endowment of the numeraire commodity  x . Let  E   x +  k +  .
Since labor is supplied inelastically, it may be taxed or subsidized in a lump-
sum fashion. Letting T denote the net present-value of lump-sum taxes imposed
by the local government on the household, the lifetime budget constraint can
now be written as
Z 1
0






te rtdt  Y: (1)
Note that household welfare is monotonic in Y . Note also that T can be negative,
corresponding to public expenditures on transfer payments or their equivalent.
3Firms. Local production is undertaken by competitive rms using capital
and local labor to produce the numeraire output according to the time-invariant
production function f(kt) with with f0(kt) > 0 > f00(kt), where kt is the amount
of capital used in the local production process at time t; f is strictly concave
because of the presence of the xed amount of local labor. Competition for
labor implies that wt = f(kt)   ktf0(kt).
While rms can hire labor services in the local spot market, their capital
inputs can only be altered by incurring adjustment costs, given by c(it)kt, with
c0 > 0 < c00, where it is the rate of gross investment within the locality at time
t, i.e., the amount of expenditures on capital goods expressed as a proportion
of the amount of capital in the locality, kt. This adjustment cost is assumed to
take the form of lost output and is expressed in units of num eraire. Note that
since c() is homogeneous of degree zero in the level of investment and the total
stock of capital, total adjustment costs are homogeneous of degree one in these
variables. Assuming that capital depreciates at a constant exponential rate of
, the evolution of the local capital stock takes the usual form:
_ k = (it   )kt: (2)
The local government imposes a per-unit tax on capital at a rate  which,
for now, is assumed to be time-invariant. The cash ow of local rms at time
t is thus the value of their output net of adjustment costs, less investment
expenditures, less tax payments, less payments for local labor:
t = f(kt)   c(it)kt   kt   itkt   wt: (3)
Firms choose the paths of investment it and capital kt to maximize the





subject to (2), with an initially-given stock of capital k0 = K0.








Because the time path of Gt is treated as exogenous, the government has to
choose just the two tax instruments, T and . Using (4), however, T can be
determined in terms of . The government is assumed to act so as to maximize
the welfare of the local representative agent. As noted, welfare is monotonic
in Y ; the government's policy problem, then, is to choose  to maximize Y ,
given that T adjusts to satisfy (4). Since prots accrue in part to non-residents,
these scal instruments allow for redistribution of income between non-resident
households and the representative agent within the locality. As discussed fur-
ther below, the model can be interpreted much more generally to provide an
4analysis of redistribution not only between local residents and owners of foreign
rms, but between generic imperfectly mobile resources (e.g., dierent types of
labor { young, skilled, etc.) and a generic immobile resource (e.g., old workers,
unskilled, etc.).
2.2 Comparative Dynamics
The present section investigates the eects of time-invariant local policies. The
rst task is to understand how a once-and-for-all unanticipated and permanent
change in the local tax on capital aects the evolution of the local capital stock.
This is studied under the assumption that the local economy is initially in a long-
run equilibrium. It is then possible to determine how the local tax policy aects
local welfare. Issues relating to time-varying and anticipated policy changes are
deferred until the next section.
Assuming that the local economy is initially in a steady-state equilibrium
with a capital stock of k1, one can characterize the impact of a change in local
policy on the local capital stock in terms of a linear second-order dierential










note that 1 > r and 2 < 0, where these inequalities depend on the concavity
of f and the convexity of c. Let 1  f0(k1)=(k1f00(k1)) denote the steady-
state value of the elasticity of demand for capital. The comparative-dynamic










from which it follows that
dkt
d
< 0 for all t > 0; (7)
that is, although an increase in the local tax on capital has no instantaneous
(\short-run") impact on the local capital stock, it reduces the capital stock
at all subsequent times. The reduction in the capital stock is monotonic, and
the magnitude of 2 determines the rate at which the capital stock falls to its
new, lower, steady-state value. In the \long run", that is, asymptotically, an
increase in the tax rate on capital by an amount equal to one percent of the
gross return to capital reduces the capital stock by 1 percent. Except insofar
as the elasticity of demand for the capital may vary, the speed of adjustment
therefore has no impact on the the long-run response of the capital stock to a
change in tax policy.2
2For example, with a Cobb-Douglas production function, 1 is a constant, and therefore
dk1=d is the same, no matter what the specication of the adjustment cost technology.
5Note from (5) that the rate of adjustment of the capital stock depends crit-
ically on c00(), that is, the second derivative of the adjustment cost function.
If the adjustment cost function is only mildly convex, so that c00 is close to
zero, then j2j is large and the adjustment to the new steady state occurs very
quickly. If c00 is large, however, j2j is small, and the adjustment to the steady
state is slow.
The principal conclusions of this analysis can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 1: Starting from an initial steady-state equilibrium, a perma-
nent unanticipated increase in the capital tax rate lowers the new steady-state
equilibrium capital stock in proportion to the elasticity of demand for capital.
The capital stock falls monotonically to its new steady-state value at a rate
that depends positively on the convexity of the adjustment cost function. In
particular, with linear adjustment costs, the adjustment is instantaneous.
2.3 The Welfare Analysis of Fiscal Policy with Imperfect
Capital Mobility
Having characterized the comparative-dynamic eects of local capital taxes on
the evolution of the capital stock, it is now possible to consider the welfare
implications of capital taxation. Substituting from (4) into (1) and noting the
























Using (6), it is clear that dY=d  0 when  = 0, with strict inequality if the
local share of ownership in local rms is less than 100%. This means that the
optimal local tax rate is positive whenever  < 1. Setting the derivative in (8)
equal to zero and using (6), one can solve (implicitly) for the (locally) optimal








Proposition 2: The optimal steady-state rate of taxation of local capital
is directly proportional to the share of foreign ownership of rms and inversely
proportional to the elasticity of demand for capital. It is inversely proportional
to the speed with which the local capital stock adjusts in response to changes in
the local rate of return on capital. In particular, if adjustment is instantaneous,
the optimal local tax rate is zero.
This key result has a number of implications. First, note that  = 0 if local
rms are owned entirely by local residents, that is, if  = 1. Second, the optimal
6tax rate is strictly positive if the local ownership share is less than 1. Third,
the optimal tax rate is inversely proportional to the elasticity of demand for
capital. Finally, the optimal tax rate is inversely proportional to 2, the speed
of adjustment of the local capital stock. It is important to note that while the
speed of adjustment depends on the fundamental data of the model (as shown in
(5)), it is endogenously determined, and the optimal tax formula (9) is therefore
an implicit characterization of the policy that a competitive government would
select.
In standard static tax competition models with costlessly-mobile capital,
the optimal local tax on capital for a small open jurisdiction is always zero if
lump-sum revenue instruments are available. (This familiar result is just an
application of the theory of the optimal tari to taxation of a traded factor of
production.) Here, that result is no longer valid, provided that (i) local rms
are owned in part by non-residents ( < 1), (ii) the local demand for capital is
less than perfectly elastic, and (iii) the speed of adjustment of the capital stock
is not instantaneous (2 nite). What accounts for these dierences?
A critical distinction between the static and dynamic models is that the
imperfect immobility of capital gives rise to quasi-rents. These rents are greater,
the slower the speed of adjustment of the local capital stock. If these rents accrue
to non-residents, at least in part, i.e., if  < 1, then taxation of capital enables
the transfer of some of these rents to the local resident household. If the capital
stock could be adjusted instantaneously (i.e., when 2 ! 1), there are no
quasi-rents to capture and the optimal local tax is zero. If capital is completely
immobile (i.e., when 2 = 0), the optimal local policy is complete expropriation
of the capital stock through conscatory taxation.
The net rate of return on capital must be equal to r in the long run, so that
the incidence of the local tax on capital thus must fall entirely on the immobile
factor in the long run, no matter what the speed of adjustment may be. During
the transition following a tax increase, the net rate of return is below the level
that can be obtained on external markets, and the local capital tax transfers
quasi-rents from capital owners to local residents. Thus, a small open locality,
whose policies have no perceptible eect on the net rate of return to capital on
external markets, can nonetheless achieve some redistribution at the expense of
the owners of imperfectly mobile resources.
While a locality's residents can benet from taxing imperfectly-mobile capi-
tal when rms are owned at least in part by non-residents, the reduction in the
stock of local capital reduces the productivity of local labor, and the steady-
state level of wage income is reduced by the taxation of mobile capital. Taxing
imperfectly-mobile capital thus involves an intertemporal tradeo for local res-
idents: they can enjoy the benets of reduced taxes for local public services,
but gradually their wage income erodes, ultimately by an amount greater than
the tax savings that they obtain by taxing capital. The preceding analysis has
shown that the taxation of local capital is in their interest in present value
terms, when discounted at the market rate of return. However, if the eects of
local policy are (socially) discounted at a lower rate, this intertemporal tradeo
becomes less favorable. Indeed, if they are not discounted at all, so that poli-
7cies are judged only by their long-run eects, the local capital tax is necessarily
harmful to local residents, even if rms are entirely owned by outsiders, and
thus should be avoided.
These ndings contrast with those in static or two-period models. Perhaps
most importantly, explicit modeling of dynamics emphasizes empirical magni-
tudes (speeds of adjustment) and their relevance for intertemporal tradeos
(short-run vs. long-run eects of policy). In a two-period model such as Lee
(1997)), for example, costly adjustment of the capital stock gives rise to a wedge,
in equilibrium, between internal and external net rates of return. Furthermore,
it limits the magnitude of the adjustment of the equilibrium capital stock in
response to tax policy: the higher the adjustment costs, the smaller the magni-
tude of equilibrium factor ows. By contrast, the explicit modeling of dynamic
adjustment highlights the fact that taxation of mobile resources can still redis-
tribute income, even though the long-run return on mobile resources is unaf-
fected by local policies and even though the incidence of taxes on these resources
are shifted entirely to immobile resources in the long run. Furthermore, higher
adjustment costs aect the speed with which mobile resources move across ju-
risdictional boundaries, not the magnitude of the long-run equilibrium resource
ow. The present analysis is similar to that in Huizinga and Nielsen (1997) in
that the taxation of capital is only attractive to a locality because of the pos-
sibility of capturing rents accruing to foreigners. In the H-N model, however,
capital is costlessly mobile, but there is (in eect) an immobile resource owned,
in part, by foreigners; by taxing perfectly mobile capital, the rents accruing to
the immobile factor are reduced.3 In the present analysis, capital itself earns
quasi-rents which gradually (and endogenously) erode over time, and the desired
degree of taxation depends critically on the speed of adjustment of the capital
stock.
3 Time-Varying (Anticipated) Local Tax Policy
The analysis in the preceding section has shown how the introduction of im-
perfect capital mobility, in the form of adjustment costs, leads to signicant
changes in the incentives for a locality to impose a tax on capital. The analysis
of tax policy in a dynamic setting, however, naturally raises questions about how
policies might vary over time, about expectations, and about time consistency.
Many of these issues have been thoroughly discussed in previous literature (see,
e.g., Turnovsky (2000)), and do not necessarily warrant detailed analysis here.
However, as has been seen noted above, the dierence between the results from
the static analysis in Section 2.1 and those of Proposition 2 derive from the
quasi-rents accruing to non-resident owners of local capital that, in the short
run, can be captured by local residents through an unanticipated permanent in-
crease in the local tax rate. Wouldn't capital owners foresee their vulnerability
3The return to the \immobile resource" in H-N is called \prot". Since there is no dynamic
adjustment in that model, the local net rate of prot can diverge permanently from that in
the rest of the world.
8and act to shield themselves from scal exploitation in this manner?
There are several ways in which the ability of a locality to extract rents from
outside owners of partially (or wholly) immobile resources may, in practice, be
limited. First, if ownership of these resources is transferable, they may be
sold by non-residents to residents, or never acquired by non-residents to begin
with. When  = 0, as shown by (9), the optimal local tax rate is zero. This
is because there are no rents to extract from outsiders, and therefore no local
benet that can oset the cost of distorting the local capital stock. Second, non-
resident owners might attempt to inuence the local policy-making process so
as to protect their quasi-rents. In principle, they would be willing to pay up to
the full amount of these rents in bribes, campaign contributions, or other rent-
preserving activities. If local policymakers are perfect rent extractors, then the
attempt to inuence the local political process will, in eect, absorb the wealth
of non-residents within the locality in much the same fashion as local taxes. On
the other hand, it is conceivable that inuence over the local political process
can be achieved by non-resident capital owners at very low cost. In this case,
the equilibrium local policy choice would involve a negligible net scal burden
on capital. A third restraint on the use of local taxation to extract rents from
non-resident capital owners is the anticipation by investors that their capital
will be subject to taxation in the future, leading them to remove some or all of
their capital from the locality before the local tax is actually imposed.
To explore this third possibility more formally, suppose, in contrast to the
model of Section 2, that all agents anticipate an increase in the local tax rate
at some date t1  0. Specically, the tax rate at time t is  for 0  t  t1 and
 + for t  t1. Note that the anticipation of the change in policy at time t1 is
equivalent, technically speaking, to the unanticipated announcement, at t = 0,
of a time-varying policy { specically, one that maintains the initial tax rate
until t = t1 and then jumps to a higher level thereafter. (The discussion in the
remainder of this section is limited to the case of a once-and-for-all change in
policy at a specied future date t1; more complex time-varying policies, with
any number of changes at any specied points of time, can be built up from
combinations of this simple one-time jump.) With an anticipated jump in the
tax rate, rms must plan their investments both before and after t1 in a prot-
























for t > t1 (6b0)
where 1 and 2 are given in (5). Note that this solution satises
dkt
d













Comparing (7) with (70), it is clear that the qualitative impact of an increase
in the local tax rate is the same, whether the tax increase is unanticipated or
anticipated. This means, of course, that the mere anticipation of a tax increase is
sucient to cause the capital stock to start shrinking right away, even though the
actual policy change may lie far in the future. However, the pre-implementation
impact of an anticipated policy change is more limited, the more distant in time
the policy change is.4 Dierentiating (10) with respect to t1, one can see that
more of the long-run adjustment will have been completed by the time that the
higher tax rate takes eect, the longer the time between the announcement of the
policy change and its implementation (i.e., the larger the value of t1). The long-
run eects of the tax increase are exactly the same regardless of whether or not
the tax increase is anticipated.5 Although the qualitative eects of anticipated
policy changes are identical to those of unanticipated ones, the two dier in
degree because the rate of decline of the capital stock in the pre-implementation
stage of adjustment (0  t  t1) is slower than would be true if the policy were
implemented immediately. Thus:
Proposition 3: (a) Starting from an initial steady-state equilibrium, a
permanent anticipated increase in the capital tax rate lowers the new steady-
state equilibrium capital stock in proportion to the elasticity of demand for
capital. The capital stock falls monotonically to its new steady-state value at a
rate that depends positively on the convexity of the adjustment cost function.
In particular, with linear adjustment costs, the adjustment is instantaneous.
(b) The anticipation of a tax increase causes the capital stock to begin falling
immediately. The more in advance the tax change is anticipated (or announced),
the more the capital stock will have adjusted by the time the tax increase takes
place.
Part (a) of Proposition 3 merely recapitulates the results stated in Proposi-
tion 1, thus emphasizing the qualitative similarity of the two cases. The second
part, which is unique to the analysis of anticipated changes, reects that fact
that the anticipation of a tax increase causes adjustment to begin right away.
Since the anticipation of a policy change does not aect the desired long-run
adjustment, we see that the main eect of anticipation of a policy change is to
lengthen and slow down the adjustment process.













e rt1 + e 1t1   e rt1
i
: (80)
4From (6a0), a higher value of t1 implies a smaller change in kt for any given t < t1.
5The last term in brackets in (6b0) depends on time, and it approaches zero as time
increases, so that (6b0) and (6) are identical in the limit.
10This expression is a generalization of (8), reducing to it when t1 = 0. Since the
terms on the right-hand-side of (80) depend negatively on t1, the anticipation
of a tax increase reduces its benet to local residents. Setting the derivative in











a generalization of (9) that allows for t1 > 0 that yields:
Proposition 4: (a) The optimal steady-state rate of taxation of local capital
is directly proportional to the share of foreign ownership of rms and inversely
proportional to the elasticity of demand for capital. It is lower, the greater the
speed with which the local capital stock adjusts in response to changes in the
local rate of return on capital. In particular, if adjustment is instantaneous, the
optimal local tax rate is zero.
(b) To the extent that an increase in the local tax rate is anticipated, the
optimal local tax rate is reduced; the more in advance the tax change is antici-
pated (or announced), the lower is the optimal local tax rate. As t1 ! 1, the
optimal local tax rate approaches zero.
The rst part of this proposition is almost identical to Proposition 2. The
second part is follows intuitively from Proposition 3: since the anticipation of
a tax increase causes an outow of capital to begin even before the higher tax
takes eect, and since this outow reduces the benets to local residents from
higher taxes, it makes sense that the optimal tax rate is lower when the owners
of local capital are not taken completely by surprise by changes in local tax
policy.
The formula for the optimal tax rate in (90) lends itself to empirical esti-
mation. Note from (6) and (6b0) that 2 is the proportionate rate of decline
of the local capital stock in response to a higher local tax (whether anticipated
or unanticipated). This means that the half-life of the post-implementation
adjustment process is ln(:5)=2. An estimate of the speed of adjustment (see
Hamermesh and Pfann (1996) for a survey) can thus be used to determine the
value of 2 and 1 = r   2, which, along with estimates of the other param-
eters in (90), determine the optimal tax rate. As one illustration, the ndings
of Decressin and Fatas (1995), who estimate that interregional labor ows in
the EU respond to market demand uctuations about half as rapidly as among
US regions of comparable size, suggest that one would likely observe higher net
scal burdens on workers in the EU context. Estimates of the speed of adjust-
ment for regions or jurisdictions of dierent sizes within countries and at the
international level and for labor and capital of dierent types could be used to
test the degree to which greater factor mobility constrains governments in using
scal policy to impose net burdens or oer net subsidies.
As observed at the beginning of this section, the desire of governments to
capture quasi-rents from non-resident owners of imperfectly mobile resources
11may discourage cross-ownership of such resources. For example, it is frequently
noted (e.g., Baxter and Jermann (1997)) that international cross-ownership of
capital is insucient to achieve full diversication of risks on nancial assets.
An intriguing question is whether political-economy considerations (essentially,
risk of expropriation through scal or other policies) plays a role in explaining
this fact.6 One might anticipate that low degrees of factor mobility (the i's)
would be associated empirically with a high degree of local ownership (). These
issues warrant further theoretical and empirical investigation.
4 Further Implications and Extensions
Competition for Types of Labor and Capital. Following much of the literature
on scal competition and on dynamic adjustment, the imperfectly mobile factor
of production k has been called \capital". There is nothing intrinsic to the
model, however, that precludes alternative interpretations of the immobile and
imperfectly mobile resources. For example, one could interpret the immobile
resource as \unskilled labor", while k could be interpreted as \skilled labor" or
\managers and entrepreneurs".7
It is straightforward to allow for multiple types of imperfectly-mobile re-
sources, at least for some simple cases. Suppose that there are many local pro-
duction sectors, each with a production function fi(ki) utilizing distinct types of
sector-specic immobile and imperfectly mobile resources ki to produce traded
goods (whose prices are taken as xed on external markets and normalized to
unity). Suppose that all of the immobile resources are owned by the represen-
tative immobile household and that each imperfectly-mobile resource can taxed
at a dierent rate i. Under these assumptions, the formulae (9) and (90) can
be applied separately for each of the mobile resources, thus characterizing the
structure of taxation for dierent types of resources. For example, if intangible
nancial assets can be adjusted very quickly, whereas manufacturing facilities
can only be adjusted slowly, the former would optimally be taxed very lightly
while the latter would be taxed relatively heavily, other things the same. Simi-
larly, the analysis implies that jurisdictions would optimally impose smaller net
scal burdens on highly-mobile workers (for example, \temporary" workers such
as non-resident business travelers).
Equilibrium for a System of Jurisdictions. In focusing on optimal policy for
a single jurisdiction, the analysis has not explicitly addressed the welfare proper-
ties of scal competition among a system of jurisdictions. These can readily be
deduced, however. From an overall eciency perspective, there are two princi-
pal issues: rst, do local tax policies result in spatial misallocation of resources,
and second, do they result in an ecient mix of taxes on mobile and immobile
6See Wildasin and Wilson (1998) for a formal model that addresses the implications of
local rent-capture for risk pooling and welfare, as well as for references to related literature.
7Of course, rms cannot \own" skilled workers or managers in the same way that they
own capital. Provided that the cost of adjusting the stock of skilled workers/managers is
an increasing function of the rate of adjustment, however, the foregoing analysis is equally
applicable to competition for human as well as non-human resources.
12resources? If all jurisdictions are perfectly symmetric, the fact that each imposes
an identical net burden on a mobile resource causes no spatial factor misalloca-
tions. However, in the more general and realistic case where jurisdictions have
diering production or adjustment-cost technologies or dier in the degree of
local ownership of mobile resources, they will optimally impose unequal scal
burdens on imperfectly-mobile factors, resulting in an inecient spatial alloca-
tion of resources for the system as a whole. This is in contrast to the results
obtained in the standard atemporal models with costless factor mobility, where,
in equilibrium, no small jurisdiction would impose a non-zero scal burden on
mobile factors which are thus, in equilibrium, allocated eciently over space. As
for the mix between taxation of mobile and immobile resources, it is rst-best
ecient to tax only the latter if, as assumed above, they are not only immobile
but perfectly inelastically supplied. As is well known, however, this conclusion
can easily be reversed if one assumes instead that the world-wide stock of mo-
bile resources is xed and the immobile resources are elastically supplied; in
this case, the rst-best policy would be to tax only the former, but competition
would shift the tax burden toward the latter.
Fiscal Competition, Redistribution, and Geographical Scale. How quickly
capital or labor can ow from one real-world jurisdiction to another is an em-
pirical question. The adjustment-cost model does not insist that factor mo-
bility is more costly on large rather than small geographical scales, and some
resources (e.g., world-class athletes, musicians, scientists, or entrepreneurs) can
move more freely over large distances than others may be able to move even
over small distances. In general, however, the mobility of resources is undoubt-
edly greater at small geographical scales. One way to capture this stylized fact
within the formal model would be to suppose that a country consists of many
identical small jurisdictions, and that the speed of adjustment for mobile re-
sources is higher within the country, i.e. among the small jurisdictions, than it
is between the country and the rest of the world. The simplest way to do this
is to suppose that adjustment costs are quadratic so that c00 in (5) is a constant
which can then parameterize the speed of adjustment: a high value of c00, and
a low speed of adjustment, would apply to international factor movements, as
compared with movement of factors among localities. Other things the same,
local governments would then optimally choose low rates of taxation on mobile
resources while a central government would choose a higher rate. This result
supports the traditional notion that higher-level governments face weaker con-
straints on their ability to engage in redistributive tax/transfer policies, even
for countries (presumably including almost all countries) which are suciently
small that they cannot aect the worldwide rate of return on capital or labor.
It also suggests an operationally-meaningful basis on which one could exam-
ine whether the localities within a state, province, metropolitan area, or other
relatively small region compete \more intensely" with one another than with
the rest of the world. Empirical analyses of tax competition among localities
within small regions (Brueckner (2001), Buettner (2001), Brueckner and Saave-
dra (2001)) nd that the amount of capital and the choice of capital tax policy
for any one local government depends on the scal policies of nearby localities.
13If capital were as freely mobile across the nation or the entire world as within a
metropolitan area, the policies of neighboring jurisdictions would have no eect
on amount of capital within a given locality and thus, presumably, no eect on
its tax policy. These empirical ndings are thus perhaps most easily explained
by faster speeds of capital-stock adjustment on smaller geographic scales.
5 Conclusion
The preceding sections have presented an explicitly dynamic analysis of scal
competition built on a standard model of costly adjustment of the stock of a
factor of production. This analysis has shown how an endogenously-determined
level of factor mobility aects the response to changes in scal policy and how
this in turn alters the desirability of alternative policies. Broadly speaking, the
analysis indicates that governments may have incentives to impose net scal
burdens on imperfectly-mobile factors of production, even though this is harmful
in the long run, because there are short-run rents that can be captured from the
non-resident owners of these factors. The short-run gains can oset the long-
run losses, at least for modest rates of net taxation. However, the ability of a
government to capture these rents depends in part on being able to \surprise"
owners of the imperfectly mobile resources, and the magnitude of the rents
themselves depend on the speed with which factor supplies adjust.
The analysis here has focused on the case of a jurisdiction that is suciently
small that its policies do not aect equilibrium factor prices in external markets.
As in the theory of the rm in a perfectly competitive industry, this obviates
the need to be concerned with strategic interactions among governments. If,
however, two or more jurisdictions are suciently large relative to external
factor markets that their policies have non-negligible impacts on factor prices,
the choice of scal policy by one will aect the optimal choices of others, and
conversely. The analysis of strategic scal interactions in a dynamic setting such
as that presented above may oer useful new insights.
While it is possible to extend the model in a straightforward fashion to allow
for several mobile factors of production in distinct sectors, it would be of consid-
erable interest to analyze the simultaneous dynamic adjustment of two or more
factors of production used in the same production process. An explicit anal-
ysis of the joint stock-adjustment problem with complementary inputs would
shed light on the optimal structure of scal treatment for dierent factors of
production, an issue of considerable empirical and policy relevance.
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16APPENDIX
This appendix presents the derivations of some of the results in the text.
A. Derivation of (6)
The key to most of the results is to understand how local tax policy aects the
local capital stock, which requires analysis of the prot-maximization problem
(P). Forming the current-value Hamiltonian
Ht  t + t(it   )kt;
the necessary conditions for a solution to (P) are
@H
@it
= 0 $ t = 1 + c0(it) (11)
 _  + rt =
@H
@kt
$  _  = f0(kt)   c(it) + (t   1)it      t(r + ): (12)
By (11), the prot-maximizing rate of investment is determined implicitly as a
function it = (t) with 0() = c00() 1 > 0. Substituting into (12) and dening
	(t)  c([t])   c0([t])(t) yields
 _  = f0(kt)   	(t)      t(r + ): (13)
Equations (2) and (13) dene a dynamical system in the two variables kt and
t. Letting 1, k1, and i1 denote steady state values, (2) and (13) imply that
i1  (1) =  (14)
f0(k1) = 	(1) +  + 1(r + ) (15)
which uniquely determine the steady state of the system.
To see how the local capital stock depends on local taxation, rst derive




















from (2) and (13). These equations, together with the boundary conditions k0 =
K0 and limt!1t = 1 =  1(), provide two linear dierential equations in
dt=d and dkt=d; assuming an initial steady-state, the coecients in these
equations are constant. To reduce the dimensionality of this system, use (14)



































with boundary conditions dk0=d = 0 and limt!1dkt=d = dk1=d = 1=f00(k1);
the characteristic polynomial of this equation has the roots stated in (5) and
direct calculation conrms that (6) is the solution to it.
B. Derivation of (8) and (9)
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where the second equality is obtained by noting rst that k1dit=d = d_ kt=d
in a steady state and then by integrating by parts.
Use (4) in (1) to eliminate T; noting the dependence of wt on kt, dierenti-



















from which (8) follows after substituting from (21) and (22).
Using (6) and setting the derivative equal to zero produces (9).
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